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INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRECLUSION AND 
FEDERAL COMMON LAW: TO WARD A 
GENERAL APPROACHt 
Stephen B. Burbankff 
In this paper, I will presen t  some tentative conclusions from 
work-in-progress . My thesis is  that  problems of interj urisdictional 
preclusion always ,  and that even preclusion problems domestic to 
s tate courts in one s tate may, presen t  problems in the relationship 
between federal and s tate law. I b elieve further that progress can be 
made in solving the mysteries of interj urisdictional preclusion by  
recognizing that, apart from the Consti tution ,  unless a federal stat­
ute provides or chooses preclusion law, the only putative federal 
preclusion law available is federal common law . Finally ,  contrary to 
conventional formulations ,  I believe that the full faith and credit 
s tatute 1 does not provide or choose preclus ion law. The perspective 
of federal common law is therefore appropriate in considering the 
law that governs the preclus ive effects of a s tate court judgment  in 
the courts of the same state,  which,  by reason of the statute,  is also  
the law that  governs i ts  interjurisdictional effects . 
At the s tart,  I acknowledge a substantial intellectual debt to 
Professor Ronan Degnan , whose 1 976  article, Federalized Res Judi­
cata, 2 dispersed fog that, in this area as in o thers involving the rela­
tionship between federal and state law, rolled in after the Supreme 
Court's decision in Erie Railroad v .  Tompkins."' Perhaps his most im­
port ant  contribution was the reminder that the full fai th and credit 
s tatute speaks to the preclusive effects of s tate court judgments in 
t © 1985 Stephen B. Burbank 
t! Associate Professor of Law and Associate Dean, University of Pennsylvania. This 
paper was delivered to the Seuion on Civil Procedure at the annual meeting of the 
American Association of Law Schools on January 5, 1 985. It summarizes the tentative 
conclusions of the author on the problems treated. A more comprehensive article is in 
preparation. Although that will be the occasion to thank the many people who have 
assisted me in this work, I want to acknowledge my gratitude to Frank Goodman and 
Linda Silberman, my colleagues and friends, for their especially valuable assistance in 
this preliminary phase. 
1 The full faith and credit statute provides that "(s]uch Acts, records and judicial 
proceedings shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the 
United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have bv law or usage in the 
courts of such State. Territory or Possession from which thev are taken." 28  U.S.C. 
§ 1738 (1982). 
'2 Degnan, Federa!r:..ed Res jud/cata, 85 \,'ALE L.J. 74 J ( 1976) . 
. , 
·' 30-1 c.s. 64 ( 1 938). 
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federal courts, and the demons tration that, as a result, in a federal 
diversity suit involving a prior s tate judgment, Erie jurisprudence 
must  yield to the s ta tutory command.4 Professor Degnan's re­
minder also made it  clear that the full faith and credit  s tatute mus t  
b e  reckoned with not only i n  subsequent diversity cases, but whenever 
a s tate court judgment is claimed to have preclusive effect in federal 
court. Al though he did not pursue those is sues, they h ave been the 
focal point of recent decisions by the Supreme Court in federal 
cases involving assertions of federal subs tantive righ t s .  
Professor Degnan did not  neglect the problem of federal judg­
ments, which neither the ful l  faith and credit clause  of the Consti tu­
tion5 nor the ful l  faith and credit s tatute appears to include.  He 
painted two his torical picture s .  The firs t depicts the Court deriving 
the obligation to respect federal judgments fro m  the ful l  faith and 
credit  s tatute .6 In  the second, depicting the law that m easures the 
basic obligation, the Conformity Act7 dominates the background, 
leading the Supreme Court to tie the preclusive effects of all fed eral 
judgments to those prescribed by the courts of the s tate in which 
they sit . 8 In  the foreground, with 1 938  a clear divide, s tand the Fed­
eral Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie . Degnan n oted the gradual 
acceptance, after some Er-ie-inspired doubts, of the proposition that 
uniform federal law governs the preclusive effects of  federal judg­
ments adjudicating matters of federal subs tantive law_9 Building on 
the rej ection of conformity in the Federal Rules, the impact of en­
hanced procedural opportuni ties on modern preclusion law, and on 
a few pre- 1 976 cases holding that federal preclusion law controls  
the effects of federal judgments adjudicating matters of s tate sub­
s tantive law, 1 0 he proposed the following as a general rule: 
A valid judgment rendered in any judiciaL system within the United States 
must be recognized by alL otherjudicial systems within the United States, and 
the claims and issues precluded by that judgment, and the parties bound 
thereby, are determined by the law of the system winch rendered the 
Judgment. 1 1 
4 See Degnan, supra note 2, at 750-55. The Rules of Decision Act provides that 
state law applies "except where . . .  Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide." 28 
U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). The full faith and credit statute requires federal courts to give the 
same effect to a state court judgment that courts in the rendering state would give it. 
5 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each Stace to the public Acts, Records, 
and JUdicial Proceedings of everv other State. And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
the Effect thereof" U. S. CaNST. art. IV, § I. 
6 See Degnan, supra note 2, at 744-50. 
7 Act of june I, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5 & ti, 17 Stat. 196, 197. 
8 See Degnan, supra note 2, at 755-57. 
9 See id. at 759-60. 
lO 
II 
See u!. at 760-71. 
!d. at 773 (emphasis in original). 
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Professor Degnan's proposed general rule  has the appeal of 
symmetry , but it also has the subs tantial advantages of simplicity 
and predictability, which are important where legal rules  shape liti­
gation conduct ,  as do preclusion rules . In my view, however, those 
advantages are purchased at a cost too great .  Applied to federal 
judgments adjudicating matters of s tate subs tantive law, as it has 
been by some l ower federal courts , 1 2 the rule risks the sacrifice of 
state subs tantive policies and of the federal policy against  different 
outcomes on the basis of citizenship .  Applied to s tate judgments 
adjudicating matters of federal substantive law, as i t  has been by the 
Supreme Court in recent cases ,  1 3 the rule risks the sacrifice of fed­
eral subs tantive policies. 
With respect to federal judgments, my research suggests that 
we need some new his torical pictures . Considering firs t  the obliga­
tion to respect federal judgments ,  it is not  just that the words of the 
full  faith and credit s tatute hardly can bear the interpretation that all  
federal court judgments are covered . 14 It is  also that the s tatute has 
always provided the measure of the obligation to respect the judg­
ments i t  covers: interjurisdictional preclusive effects are measured 
by domestic preclusive effects . 1 5  Federal courts in territories ,  coun­
tries subj ect to the jurisdiction of the United S tates , and the Dis trict 
12 See, e.g . . Silcox v. United Trucking Serv. , 687 F.2d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 1982); 
Miller v. A.I-1. Robins Co., 565 F. Supp. 24, 25 n.2 (S.D. Fla. 1983). 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 73-80. The word "adjudicating" in this con-
text includes the preclusion of federal claims and issues not raised as such in the initial 
action. 
1 4 As enacted in 1790, the statute provided that the duly authenticated "records 
and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state . . . shall have such faith and credit 
given to them in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the 
courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken." Act of May 26, 
1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122. The obligation thus imposed was extended to the records and 
judicial proceedings of the courts "of the respective territories of the United States, and 
countries subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" by the Act of Mar. '2.7, 1804, 
ch. 55. 2 Stat. '2.98, 299. "It would be little more than an act of blind heroism to contend 
that federal courts arc included as the courts of a country 'subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States. ' The rendition of this phrase as referring to a 'possession' of the 
United States in the present codification of the Judicial Code seems to reflect a much 
more probable interpretation." 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, FEDERAL PRAC­
TICE & PROCEDURE§ 4468, at 651 n. \0 (1981) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER & 
COOPERl . 
15 With respect to the interjurisclictional effects of the proceedings of state courts in 
other states, the statute implements the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. 
See supra note 5. The full faith and credit statute's extension of the obligation to federal 
courts has been thought to represent a "nearly contemporaneous" construction of the 
constitutional provision by the f1rst Congress. Degnan, supra note'!., at 744 .  
Congress's power to prescribe the effects of federal judicial proceedings docs not 
derive from article IV, S I. E.g . .  Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 130, 134 
(1875 );  Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1883); see also infra text accompannng notes 
20-22. 
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of Columbia 1 6 can be assimila ted to s tate courts for purposes  of the 
measure of interjurisdictional effects the s tatute provide s .  But for 
other, geographically dispersed, federal courts there is  no obvious 
domestic referent or model . The problem of dome s ticating federal 
judgments for purposes of the ful l  faith and credit s ta tute  might ap­
pear to have inspired the rule s tated in early cases that the preclu­
sive effects of a federal court judgment are determined by the 
preclusion law applied in the courts of the s tate in which the render­
ing federal court sits . But the first case to s tate the rul e  did not 
mention the s tatute,  17 and the firs t case to sugges t  the relevance of 
the statute did not involve a federal court that sat in a s tate . 18 More­
over, long before 1 938  the Supreme Court held that ,  a t  least  in  
some cases ,  federal preclusion law governs the effects of  federal 
judgments adjudicating matters of federal subs tantive law. 1 9 
In fact, the firs t decision of the Supreme Court dealing with the 
problem of respect for federal judgments suggested that the obliga­
tion to respect the federal judgment involved in that case derived 
from the federal  statutes that created the court and ves ted it  with 
1 6 See Embry, 107 U.S. at 10 ("The question then arises, what causes would have 
heen sufficient in the District of Columbia, according to the law then in force, to have 
authorized its courts to set aside the judgment . . ."); mfra text accompanying note 18. 
It is not necessary to read Embry as interpreting the statute to cover the judicial proceed­
ings of all federal courts. But see Degnan, supra note 2, at 746-47. Early commentators 
suggested that the District of Columbia, whose court's judgment was involved in Embry, 
was a "'country subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. ' "  Note, Conclusiveness 
and Ef ect of Judgments as between Federal and State Courts, 21 U.S. C. C.A. Rep. 478 (1897) . 
See also Note, Res judicata as a Federal Question, 25 1-l.-\RV. L. REv. 443, 445 (1912). In  any 
event, the Court had already posited an obligation to respect federal judgments and 
prescribed the effects of a federaljudgment without relying on the statute. See Dupasseur, 
88 U.S. (21  Wall.) at 134-35; infra text accompanying note 20. Moreover, in Embry itself 
the Court relied on a prior decision in which it had recognized. albeit without reference 
to the supplemental act of 1804, that " the act of Congress does not apply to the courts 
of the United States . . ." Turnbull v. Pavson, 95 U.S. 418, 423 (1877), cited in Embry, 
I 07 U.S. at I 0. In some cases, however, the Court did rely on the full faith and credit 
statute in according preclusive effect to the judgments of federal courts. See, e.g., Metcalf 





See Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 88 U.S. (21 'Nail.) 130 ( 1875) 
Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3 (1883). 
See, e.g., Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499 (1903), in which the Court 
But it is equally well settled that a right claimed under the Federal 
Constitution, finally adjudicated m the Federal courts, can never be taken 
away or impaired by state decisions. The same reasoning which permits 
to the States the right of final adjudication upon purely state questions 
requires no less respect for the final decisions of the Federal courts of 
questions of national authority and jurisdiction. 
!d. at 517. See also Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273, 290-91 (1906); 18 
V\'RIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 14, § 44GS, at 65G-57. But Deposit Bank hardly 
"made explicit" the rule "that federal rules measure at least most res judicata ques­
tions" as Wright, Miller, and Cooper argue !d. at 656. 
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jurisdiction .20 The notion that implicit in, and necessary to fructify,  
a congress ional grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is an obliga­
tion on the state courts not  by their own lights to disregard a judg­
ment entered by that court should win easy acceptance from those 
accustomed to federal common lawmaking.  Perhaps in the nine­
teenth century the decision involved a more extreme form of "judi­
cial legislation"2 1  than the wrenching out o f  shape o f  the ful l  faith 
and credit statute,  but again, federal common law is not a recent 
phenomenon. In any event ,  under the decision that advanced the 
sugges tion, s ta te law was held to furnish the measure of respect due 
the federal judgment ,  and like the basic obligation itself, the s tate 
preclusion rules were binding throughout the nation under the 
supremacy clause.22 Here, in o ther words ,  i s  a theory of respect for 
20 
Where a State court refuses to give effect to the judgment of a court 
of the United States rendered upon the point in dispute, and with juris­
diction of the case and the parties, a question is undoubtedly raised 
which, under the Act of 1867, may be brought to this court for revision. 
The case would be one in whzch a title or right is claimed under an authority exercised 
under the United States, and the decision is agamst the title or right so set up. It 
would thus be a case arismg under the laws of the United States, establishing the 
Czrcuit Court and vestmg it with yurisdiction; and hence it would be within the 
judicial power of the United States, as defined by the Constitution; and it 
is clearly within the chart of appellate power given to this court, over 
cases arising in and decided by the State courts. 
The refusal by the courts of one State to give eifht to the deczswns of the courts of 
another State zs an mfnngernent of a different article of the Constztutwn, to wzt, the 
first section of article four; and the right to bring such a case before us by writ 
of error under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act, or the Act of 
1867, is based on the refusal of a State court to give validity and effect to 
the right claimed under that article and section. 
In either case, therefore, whether the validity or due effect of a judg­
ment of the State court, or that of a judgment of a United States court, is 
disallowed by a State court, the Constitution and laws furnish redress by a 
final appeal to this court. 
Dupasseur v. Rocherau, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 130, 134 (1875) (emphasis added). See 18 
WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 14, § 4468, at 654. 
21 Costigan, The Histm}' of the Adoption of Section 1 of Article IV of the United States Constz­
tutwn and a Conszderatwn of the Effect on judgments of that Section and of Federal Legzslation, 4 
COLUM. L. REV. 470, 484 (1904). 
2 2  
The only effect that can be justly claimed for the judgment in the 
Circuit Court of the United States, is such as would belong to judgments 
of the State courts rendered under similar circumstances. Dupasseur & Co. 
were citizens of France, and brought the suit in the Czrcuit Court of the United States 
as such citz:ens; and, consequently, that court, denving its yunsdlctwn solely from the 
citiZenslup of the partws, was in the exenise of jurisdiction to admzmster the laws of 
the State, and zts proceedings were had m accordance with the forms and course of 
proceeding zn the State courts. I t  is apparent, therefore, that no higher sanc­
tity or effect can be claimed for the judgment . . .  rendered in such a case 
under such circumstances than is due to the judgments of the State courts 
in a like case and under similar circumstances. I f  by the laws of the State 
a judgment like that rendered by the Circuit Court would have had a 
binding e!Tect as against Rochereau, if it had been rendered in a State 
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federal j udgments that has the promise of coherence . The problem 
in each case is to determine the law that  governs the p reclus ive ef­
fects of a federal j udgment .  Once determined, that law, whether 
federal or s tate ,  is  binding under the supremacy clause because, or 
to the extent that, it defines the measure of the bas ic  obligation to 
respect the j udgment .  
A new his torical picture is a l so  needed for the law governing 
the preclus ive effects of  federal j udgments . I have already noted 
that 1938 marked no great divide with respect to judgments on fed­
eral questions ,23 and that there was thus no monolithic rule requir­
ing the use of s tate law prior to that time. Moreover, the i mpetus to 
apply s tate law to federal diversity j udgments lay les s  in  the Con­
formity Act than in the duty of a federal court exercis ing diversity 
j urisdiction to "administer the laws of the State ," by  which the 
Court meant s tate substantive law.24 Thus , whether the Court ap­
pl ied s tate preclusion law or federal preclusion law to federal j udg­
ments, the emphasis was on the source of the s ub stantive law 
administered by the rendering court .  That may come as a surprise 
to those who have been taught to think of preclus ion as procedure 
and to think of procedure as disembodied from substantive right s .  
In the nineteenth century and beyond, the central function of pre­
clusion law was thought to be the protection of the subs tantive 
rights embodied in a j udgment .25 
So much for his tory. I wi l l  not belabor my analysis  of the law 
that governs the preclusive effects of the j udgments of federal courts 
coun, then it should have the same effect, being rendered by the Circuit 
Court. !f such effect 1s not conceded to it, but is refused, then due validity and effect 
are not gwen to it, and a case is made for the m/erposition of the power of reversal 
co nfened upon !Ius court. 
IJupasseur, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 135 (emphasis added). 
:23 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
24 Dupasseur, 88 U.S. (21 Wall. ) at 135; see also supra note 22; 18 WRIGHT, rYliLLER & 
CooPER, supra note 1 4 ,  § 4468. The headnotes to Dupasseur were written by Justice 
Bradley, author of the Court's opinion. Headnote 3 provides in relevant part: "If juris­
diction of the case was acquired only by reason of the citizenship of the parties, and the 
state law alone was administered, then only such validity and effect can he claimed for 
the judgment as would be due to the judgment of the State Courts Linder like circum­
stances." Dupasseur v. Rochereau, 22 L. Ed. 588 (1875). See also Bigelow v. Old Domin­
ion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. Ill, 129-30 (1912) . 
This doctrine of res judicata is not a mere matter of practice or proce­
dure inherited from a more technical time than ours. It is a rule of funda­
memal and substantial justice, "of public policy and of private peace," 
which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts to the end 
that rights once established bv the final judgment of a court of competent 
jurisdiction shall be recognized by those who are bound by it in every 
,,·a v, w hercver the judgment is emi tied to res peer. 
Han Steel Co. v. Railroad Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917). See also Deposit Bank v. 
Frankfort. 191 U.S. 499, 520 (1903). 
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adjudicating matters of federal substantive law . That uniform fed­
eral law applies has been generally assumed, and indeed the propo­
sition has been s tated, without analys i s ,  by the Supreme Court on a 
number of occasions . 26 The conclusion may seem obvious ,  and cer­
tainly there i s  federal lawmaking competence. If, however, one ana­
lyzes the problem as a problem of federal common law, the 
conclusion i s  not self-evident ,  precisely because it imports uniform 
federal rules rather than state law borrowed as federal law except 
where i t  i s  hosti le to or inconsistent with federal policies .27 For 
those who are skep tical of any role for s tate law, even borrowed as 
federal law, a consideration of l imitations periods  under federal s tat­
utes not containing any may provide food for thought.28 Further, 
the j us tifications for uniform federal preclusion rules  are harder to 
come by for one who believes ,  as I do, that the Rules of Decision 
Act29 has received rough treatment in the Supreme Court ' s  federal 
common law decis ions . 30 I believe that the conclusion is correct, in 
part because a regime of borrowed s tate law .would present serious 
problems of administrabi l i ty for both courts and lit igant s .  3 1 
Federal judgments adj udicating matters of s tate subs tantive law 
are , however, another matter. Here , the Rules of Decision Act must  
be confronted unless  one accepts Professor Degnan's  argument 
that, because the power conferred by article I I I  on the federal courts 
26 Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 
324 n.l2 (1971); Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 li . S. 165, I 70-71 (1938). See aLso Heiser v. Wood­
ruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 ( 1946); supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
27 For a representative example of the Supreme Court's approach to federal com­
mon law after Ene, see Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States , 318 U. S. 363 (1943). For 
more recent treatment, see United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979). 
See generally Friendly, In Prmse of Ene- and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 383 ( 1964); Mishkin, The l'ariowness of' 'Federal Law". Competence and Dzscretion In the 
Choice of Natwnal and State Rules For Dewwn, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797 (1957); Note, The 
Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1512 (1969). Because they are "[!]ega! rules 
which impact significantly upon the effectuation of federal rights, [preclusion rules) must 
. .  be treated as raising federal questions" in this context. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 
471, 477 (1979). 
28 See, eg., liAW v. Hoosier Cardinai Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966). Professor Scott 
noted that limitations periods and preclusion rules have a common purpose of "putting 
an end to controversies. " Scott, Collateral Estoppel byjudgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. I (1942). 
29 "The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the 
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as 
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they 
apply." 28 U.S C. § 1652 (1982). 
30 See, e.g., De! Costello v. International Bhd. ofTeamsters, 103 S. Ct. 2281, 2287-
88 n.13 (1983); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 4!2 U.S. 580, 590-94 
( 1973); see aLso rnfra notes 36 & 59 and accompanying text. 
3 1  The problems for the federal courts would include supervising a system of bor­
rowed, trans-substantive state preclusion law to ensure against the application of partic­
ular rules that are hostile to or inconsistent with federal policies. The problems for 
litigants would include ascertaining the state law to be borrowed: a miscalculation could 
lead to the loss of federal rights. 
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finally to determine the preclusive effects of their j ud gments is im­
plicated at some point ,  i t  is  best to ignore the Act .32 I do not accept 
that argument,33 nor the argument that federal common law is one 
of  the sources of federal law that, if  i t  o therwise requires or  pro­
vides,  displaces state law under the Act . 34 Finally , I do not  accept 
the argument that the R ules of Decision Act plays a role but  the role 
i t  plays is up to the reader, who is free to manipulate the language 
"in the cases where they apply , "  as he or she chooses . 35  In  my view,  
the Rules of Decision Act speaks directly to  the circum stances when 
it is permissible for federal courts to fashion or apply federal com­
mon law.36 
The two most influential works discussing interj urisdictional 
preclusion s ince Professor Degnan's article have been the Restate­
ment (Second) of Judgments,37 and volume 1 8 of Wright ,  Miller and 
Cooper's treatise on federal practice and procedure . 38 Nei ther work 
fully embraces Professor Degnan's general rule  as applied to federal 
j udgments adj udicating matters of s tate substantive law .  Both en­
dorse the view that federal law controls but  suggest that state pre­
clusion law should be borrowed when i t  reflects s tate substantive 
32 See Degnan, supra note 2, at 768-70. 
33  The Court has acknowledged plenary power i n  Congress to prescribe the prac­
tice and procedure of the federal courts, see, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-74 
(1965); Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. l, 9-10 (1941), as well 2.s the rules of evidence 
applied therein, see Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 265-66 ( 1980); Usery v. Turner 
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 31 ( 1976). Accordinglv, the Court is unlikely to hold 
that the power to formulate rules having greater substantive implications, such as rules 
of preclusion, is "necessary to the exercise of all others," United States v. Hudson, 11 
U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812), with the result that in formulating them the courts would 
be "shielded from direct democratic controls." Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 44 7 
U.S. 752, 764 ( 1980). For a discussion of the inherent power of federal courts, see Bur­
bank, Sanctions m the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Cwil Procedure: Some Ques­
twns About Power, 11 HoFSTRA L. REv. 997, 1004-06 (1983); see also Burbank, The Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1015, 1115 n.455 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act]. 
34 See Westen, After "Life for Erie"-A Reply, 78 MICH. L. REv. 971, 985-88 (1980); 
Westen & Lehman, Is There Life for Erie after the Death of Dzversity ?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311, 
369-71 (1980). On this point, I agree with Professor Redish. See Redish, Continumg the 
Ene Debate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L. REv. 959, 962-64, 968 n.60 
(1980). 
35 See Redish, supra note 34, at 968-69 n.60. 
36 For the text of the act, see supra note 29. Under this view. federal common law 
applies where "the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress" 
expressly so "provide" or where, fairly read, they implicitly and plausibly call for ("re­
quire") it. The act should not, however, be interpreted ·'in a crabbed or wooden fash­
ion." Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584. 598 (1978) (Blackmun, J. ,dissenting). See 
also 1njra note 59 and accompanying text. 
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF jUDGMENTS (1982). 
38 18 WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 14. 
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policies . 39 I believe they both have i t  backwards .  
Uniform federal rules may  be required when dealing with some 
aspects of preclusion law, regardless of  the substantive law applied 
by the rendering federal court or the ground of its jurisdiction .  But 
th.:se matters involve preconditions to s tatus as a j udgment enti tled 
to recognition ,  such as validity and finality, or their functional 
equivalent, the "on the merits" excep tion to bar, where federal s tan­
dards may be necessary to protect the basic obligation of respect .40 
Indeed, in circuits that have not clearly committed themselves to 
Professor Degnan's general rule but that have applied federal pre­
clusion law to some matters , the matters have clus tered around 
these problems .4 1 We may forgive reliance on rule 41 (b)42 as the 
source of the federal preclusion rule,43 but we should not extrapo­
late from the cases a principle broader than that which was neces­
sary to decide them. 
If that were all, neither a traditional federal common law analy­
sis nor a Rules of Decision Act approach would lead one to conclude 
that uniform federal rules are required for all ques tions of preclu-
39 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF juDGMENTS§ 87 comment b, at 316-18 (1982); 18 
WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 14, § 4472, at 732-40. 
40 For treatments of validity and finality from a domestic perspective, see RESTATE­
MENT (SECOND) OF juDGMENTS § 1-16 (1982) . The Second Restatement has discarded the 
"on the merits" label but retains exceptions to bar. Id. § 20. 
The obligation to respect federal judgments would be meaningless if state courts 
were free to define for themselves those judgments that would be respected. That 
premise does not, of course, automatically mean that uniform federal rules apply. But, 
particularly because such rules govern where the federal judgment adjudicates a federal 
question, see supra text accompanying notes 26-31, and given the undisputed federal in­
terest in protecting the basic obligation of respect, uniform federal rules do seem appro­
priate and may be thought to be required. For a case suggesting that federal preclusion 
law governs an issue of validity of a diversity judgment, see Baldwin v. Iowa State Trav­
eling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931). 
In the case of so-called disciplinary dismissals under FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (b) , the basic 
federal interest is buoyed by the additional consideration that uncertainty as to the bind­
ing nature of federal judicial action might lead to disregard of valid Federal Rule� and 
orders and that the costs of such disregard would fall on the federal courts. 
4l See, eg, PRC Harris, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 700 F.2d 894, 897 (2d Cir.) , cert. demed, 
104 S. Ct. 344 (1983) (federal law governs effect of dismissal of diversity action under 
FED. R. Crv. P. 41 (b)) ;  Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee v. L'Union Atlantique S.A. 
D'Assurances, 723 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1983) (same); Hunt v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 707 
F.2d 1493, \497 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (federal law governs finality of diversity judgment). 
For a subsequent case qualifying broad language in Hunt, see Answering Serv. v. Egan, 
728 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
42 FED. R. CIV P. 41 (b). 
43 See Degnan, supra note 2, at 760-63. Cf. Cemer v. Marathon Oil Co., 583 F.2d 
830, 832 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (rule 41 (b) dismissal in federal action assening 
federal substantive rights) . For the role that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure can prop­
erly play in connection with preclusion law, see mfra text accompanying notes 45-53. 
The conclusion that federal law controls on these matters does not extend to the 
law governing the claims or issues that may be precluded by the judgment or the parties 
who may benef1t from or are bound by the judgment. 
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sion. The matters considered thus far are a discrete group recogniz­
able as such by courts and litigants. As to the rest of preclusion law, 
federal substantive interests are contingent, implicated only if the 
application of preclusion rules in subsequent litigation would fore­
close federal claims or issues not originally asserted, while state sub­
stantive interests are directly implicated. Given a clearly articulated 
choice of law rule for diversity cases, problems of administrability of 
a system of borrowed state law would not be serious for litigants.44 
Moreover, federal procedural interests, to the extent they are even 
cognizable, are not merely contingent. From the point of view of 
the administrability concerns of the federal courts, they are nonexis­
tent. The costs of subsequent litigation would be incurred by the 
federal courts only if that litigation were brought or removed there. 
In such a situation, the federal court would be well positioned to 
check the application of state law that was hostile to or inconsistent 
with federal policies. Finally, diversity cases require attention to the 
independent federal policy against different outcomes on the basis 
of citizenship. 
Courts and commentators have used a variety of techniques to 
justify a uniform body of federal preclusion law for diversity judg­
ments. Professor Degnan's approach attributed some preclusion 
rules to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, using Hanna v. 
Plumer-15 as a shield, 46 and invoked article III for the rest.47 This 
tec�nique will not work. Even the Advisory Committee that drafted 
the original Federal Rules, a group not overly concerned about the 
Enabling Act's limitations, realized that preclusion rules were off­
limits,48 and in 1 946 their successor body corrected a departure 
from that view.49 Rule 1 8(a) on joinder of claims is anything but a 
statement of preclusion policy. 5° This is particularly clear when its 
41 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U. S. 487 ( 194 l ) .  Compare supra note 
31 and accompanying text. 
+5 380 U. S. 460 (1965). 
·H) See Degnan, .wpra note 2, at 763 & n.l 05. 
·1 7 See id. at 763-71; supra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
-18 See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Acl, supra note 33, at 1131-37 (1982). For the 
Committee's rejection of a proposal that their class action rule specify the effect of judg­
ments on persons not parties, see id. at 1164 n.637. See also mfra note 53. 
-19 A 1946 amendment to rule 14 deleted the following sentence: "The third-party 
defendant is bound by the adjudication of the third-party plaintiff's liability to the plain­
tiff. as \\·ell as of his own to the plaintiff or to the third-partv plaintiff." 3 j. MooRE, 
\ioORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE �i 14.01[1). at 14-7 (2d cd. 1984) [hereinafter cited as 
MoORE]. According to the Advisory Committee, the sentence was "stricken from Rule 
14(a), not to change the law, but because the sentence states a rule of substantive law 
which is not within the scope of a procedural rule. It is not the purpose of the rules to 
state the effect ofajudgment." !d.� 14.01[3]. at 14-11. 
50 ".-\ party asserting a claim to relief as an original cla1m, counterclaim. cross­
claim, or third-party claim, mav join, either as independent or as alternate claims. as 
many claims. legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an opposing partv." FED. R. 
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permissive language is  contras ted with rule 1 3 (a) ' s  mandatory lan­
guage on compulsory counterclaims . 5 1 The latter is a product of 
his tory ,  notably Equity Rule 30, which had been interpreted accu­
rately to predict preclusion consequences for failure to comply . 5� 
At most ,  rule 1 3  (a) is a s tatement of policy suitable as a peg on 
which to hang a federal common law rule of preclusion ,  waiver, or 
estoppel,  one hopes a rule more flexible than the terms of rule 1 3 (a) 
suggest .  53 
Another technique used to j us tify a uniform body of federal 
preclusion law for diversity judgments is to ignore post-Erie cases 
suggesting that, in diversity cases ,  federal common law cannot dis ­
place state law where differences between the two would materially 
affect the character or result  of li tigation in federal court, leading to 
Civ. P .  1 8 (a) . See Commercial Box & Lumber Co.  v .  Uniroyal ,  Inc . , 623 F . 2d 3 7 1 ,  374 
n .2 (5th Cir .  1 98 0 ) ;  Degnan, supra note 2, at 7 64 .  
5 1  A pleading shal l  s tate as a counterclaim any claim which at the t ime of 
serving the p leading the p leader has against any opposing party, i f  i t  
arises o u t  of the transaction o r  occurrence that i s  t h e  subject matter of 
the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adj udication the 
p resence of  third parties of  whom the court cannot acquire j urisdict ion.  
FED. R. CIV .  P .  1 3 (a ) .  
52 On Equity Rule 3 0 ,  s e e  American Mi l l s  C o .  v .  American Sur.  C o . , 260 U . S .  360 
( 1 922) . Under rul e  30, " [t ]hat  which grows out of  the subj ec t-malter of the bil l  must be 
set up in the in terest of an end of l i ti gation . "  !d. at 365. Al though the original Advisory 
Committee refrained from stat ing a rule of preclusion or, more genera l ly ,  of effects, in 
the text of rule 1 3 (a) , i t  cited American A/ills for the conclusion that " [ i jf  the action pro­
ceeds to judgment without the interposi t ion of a counterclaim as required bv subdivi­
sion (a) of this rule,  the counterclaim is barred ."  3 Jv1ooRE, supra note 49 ,  � I  1 3 .0 1 [2 J,  at 
1 3-8 .  See also Baker v .  Gold Seal Liquors, 4 1 7  U . S .  467, 469 n . 1 ( 1 974) ; Southern Con­
str .  Co.  v .  Pickard, 3 7 1  U.S .  57,  60 ( 1 962) (per curiam) .  
53 The history of the  Rules  Enabling Act of 1 934 reveals that  Congress did not  
mean to authorize court  ru les  having a predictable and direct effect on  rights claimed 
under the substantive law. See Burbank, supra note 33, at 1 1 2 1 -3 1 .  Preclusion rules have 
this proscribed effect .  Rule 1 3 (a)  i s  val id because it docs not purport to s tate a rule of 
preclusive effect .  Moreover, even though the rule is  animated by a purpose  that is dubi­
ous under the Enabling Act, i t s  preclusion implications are patent ,  and i t  was not 
blocked bv Congress.  Therefore, as long as a putative federal common law ru le of pre­
clusion, waiver, or es toppel did not mimic the seemingly inAexible command of the rule, 
thereby accomplishing indirectly what could not be accomplished directly,  the rule could 
serve as a source of  policy.  
On the use of rule 1 3 (a)  to create a waiver or estoppel ,  see Wright ,  Estoppel by Rule: 
The Compulsory Counterclaim L:nder ;\!fodem Pleading, 3 8  M I N N .  L. REV. 423 ( 1 954) .  The 
author of that article observes :  
Can a neater example be imagined of  the impossibi l i ty  of sensible dis t inc­
t ions between "substance" and " procedure" )  Compulsory counterclaim 
provisions are enacted as a regulation of " procedure , "  and indeed if. as  
in most jurisdict ions,  they have been made by ru le of court , they are val id 
only as a regulation of  "procedure" which must leave rights of " sub­
stance" unimpaired . Yet their effects are held to be extra-terntorial  on 
the explicit  ground that these e ffects are · · substant ive." 
Id. at 43ti .  
636 CORNELL LA W RE VIE W [Vol .  70: 625 
forum shopping and inequitable adminis tration of  the laws . 54 One 
could argue that th is  "policy of federal j urisdiction" 55 is  not  impli­
cated in  the preclusion context because preclus ion law does not 
have its ul timate bite in the rendering court, but the argument is  
purely formaJ .56 One is  led to believe that  the commentators who 
have modified Professor Degnan's  general rule to the extent of bor­
rowing s tate preclusion law only when i t  implicates s tate substantive 
policies must s imply disagree with the Erie l ine of  cases and their 
emphas is on the effects ,  rather than the purposes ,  of  legal rules . 57 
In  my view, unexpressed disagreement with those cases will not  
do .58 I a l so  believe that,  if the  cases are taken seriously,  i t  i s  ex­
tremely difficult ,  under a tradi tional federal common law analysis or 
a Rules of Decision Act approach, to j ustify either across-the-board 
uniform federal preclusion rules for diversity j udgments adj udicat­
ing matters of state substantive law, or the borrowing of  s ta te pre­
clusion rules only when they implicate substantive state policies .59 
54 See, e.g. , Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 ,  744-46, 752-53 ( 1 98 0 ) ;  
Hanna v. Plumer, 3 8 0  U.S. 460, 466-69 ( 1 965) (dictum). 
55 Guaranty Trust Co. v.  York, 326 U.S. 99 ,  1 0 1  ( 1 945) . See mfra note 59 .  
5 6  Under the theory of respect for federal judgments suggested above, see supm text 
accompanying notes 20-22, the purpose of the exercise is precisely to determine what 
law will furnish the rules of preclusion for a federal judgment. Once those rules are 
ascertained, not only will they be binding under the supremacy clause in subsequent 
federal or state actions , but they will affect the strategy and conduct of litigation in the 
rendering court. As Professor Degnan acknowledged, albeit in a different context, " [i ] f  
'outcome determinative' is the  relevant test . ., hardly anything is more dispositive 
than the doctrine of res judicata. " Degnan, supra note 2 ,  at 754 (footnote omitted). 
57 See supra note 39.  
58 For expressed disagreement, see, e.g , Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Dw­
swn Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 9 1  HARV. L. REV. 356 ( 1 97 7 ) ;  Redish, supra 
note 34 . 
59 The Rules of Decision Act need not be interpreted to remit federal courts to 
state law whenever a matter has escaped treatment in federal statutes, in Federal Rules 
authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2072 ( 1 98 2) , or in local court rules authorized by 28 U. S. C. 
§ 207 1 ( 1 98 2) .  When it authorized the Court to promulgate Federal Rules, Congress 
must have contemplated that it would be necessary for the federal courts to interpret 
them and to fill in the interstices of the rules themselves. That does not mean that the 
federal courts are free to create common law in areas untouched by the Federal Rules, 
or that they may, through federal common law, attribute to the Federal Rules policies 
not validly the concern of such rules. It does mean, however, that when the Supreme 
Court has exercised the power delegated by Congress to prescribe uniform Federal 
Rules, these rules, if valid, should be treated as if they were acts of Congress for pur­
poses of the Rules of Decision Act. A similar analysis may apply to local court rules, at 
least if current proposals to discipline the process of their consideration and promulga­
tion are adopted. See H.R. 6344, 98th Con g., 2d Sess. § 4 ( 1 984 ) ;  Judicial Conference of 
the United States, Prelimmary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce­
dw e, 98 F.R.D. 3 3 7 ,  370-73 ( 1 98 3 ) ;  39 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan), Release 4, at 1 -2 
(Oct. 1 984 ) .  
In determining, however, whether federal sources "require " otherwise than that 
state law be applied, the federal courts must consider not only policies grounded in 
them that point towards a federal decisional rule, but also those federal policies that 
point to the application of state law. The "policy of federal jurisdiction, " supra text ac-
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The best  hope is to  treat the federal courts as a domestic system, in  
which case a federal interest in efficient j udicial adminis tration, if i t  
i s  cognizable after Hanna and Walker, 6 0  i s  a t  least  not contingent and 
might be thought by some process to outweigh the policy against  
different outcomes on the basis of citizenship .  But  the ful l  faith and 
credit s tatute does not apply to federal j udgments ;6 1 the domestic  
model  it enshrines does not necessarily entail domes tic law,62 and 
the federal courts have not been permitted to act as if they were, 
that i s ,  with the autonomy of, s tate courts in other contexts involv­
ing the exercise of diversity j urisdiction .  Rather, they have been re­
quired to do what the courts of a particular s tate would do .63 Until  
such time as the Court repudiates or redirects the post-Erie cases64 
or Congress clearly expresses procedural policies that resonate for 
preclusion law in the way rule 1 3 (a) now does , s tate law should pro­
vide the norm on most  questions .  
Some of the appeal of Professor Degnan's  proposed general 
rule and, one suspects ,  part of the s timulus to propose  i t ,  l ies in the 
conviction that s tate law always governs the interjurisdictional 
preclusive effects of a s tate court j udgment .  55 To one reading the 
s tatute for the first  t ime, this conclusion is  by no means obvious :  
Such Acts , records a n d  j udicial proceedings . . .  shal l  have the 
same full faith and credit in  every court within the United S tates 
and its  Territories and Possessions as they have by law o r  usage in 
the courts of  such S ta te ,  Territory or  Possession fro m  which they 
are taken .66 
In enacting the s tatute Congress exercised the power expressly con­
ferred on i t  by article IV, section 1 of the Cons ti tution to prescribe 
the interj urisdictional effects of s tate j udgments . 67 This constitu­
tional grant of power does not extend to the preclusive effects of 
s tate j udgments in the courts of the same s tate .  Rather, Congress 
referred to those effects as the measure of the constitutional ( that is ,  
in terj urisdictional) obligation under the s tatute.  The s tatute simply 
does not speak to the source of the law that furnishes the rules in 
companying note 5 5 ,  ident ified with the exercise of d iversity jurisdict ion,  i s  one of the 
latter.  
60 Walker v .  Armco Steel Corp . ,  446 U . S .  740 ( 1 980) ; Hanna v .  Plumer, 380 U . S .  
4 6 0  ( 1 965) . 
6 1 See supra text accompanying notes 1 4 - 1 9 .  
6 2  See tn[ra text accompanying notes 65-72 .  
6 3  See, e g ,  Klaxon Co.  v .  Stentor Elec .  Mfg.  C o ., 3 1 3  U .S .  487 ( 1 94 1 ) .  
64 See Redish & Phil l ips,  supra note 5 8 .  
b 5  See Degnan ,  supra n o t e  2, at 750-5 3 .  But see td. at 755  n . 6 0 .  I n  a n y  event ,  a s  a 
normative mat ter, Professor Degnan favored the appl ication of state law.  See id. at 773  
(quoted supra text  accompanying note  I I ) .  
66 28 u . s . c .  § 1 7 38 ( 1 98 2 ) . 
67 See supra note 5 .  
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the domestic configuration i t  uses as the referent .  Although s tate 
law will usually furnish such rules ,  federal law may supervene in 
some cases as a result of principles governing the relationship be­
tween federal and s tate law having their source elsewhere . Any such 
supervening federal law will ,  by reason of the s tatute ,  b e  b inding 
nationally, because i t  is ,  by reason of  the supremacy clause ,68 bind­
ing domestically. 
We have, then, another problem of federal common law. 
Where " [l] egal rules . . .  [have a s ignificant] impact . . .  upon the 
effectuation of federal rights , "69 as do preclusion rules on federal 
substantive rights ,  there i s ,  under traditional analys i s ,  federal p ower 
to choose the governing law.7° In  most s i tuations ,  however, uni­
form federal preclusion rules are not  required becaus e  the s tate law 
to be borrowed is clear and because uniform rules might prove dis­
ruptive to s tate courts and to l it igants . 7 1 Federal law-in-reserve, 
available to check particular s tate preclusion rules that are hostile to 
or inconsis tent with federal substantive interes ts ,  i s  sufficient .  The 
same result obtains under a Rules of Decision Act approach, and in 
this context ,  the advantages of  that approach are s triking.72 
68 U . S .  CaNST. art. VI, cl .  2 .  
69 B urks v .  Lasker, 44 1 U.S .  4 7 1 ,  477  ( 1 979 ) ;  see supra note  2 7 .  
7 0  Typically , however, the analysis o f  the problem o f  federal l a w  i n  s tate courts, a t  
least  i f  the law can b e  labelled "procedural , "  has been discre te .  Compare, e.g. ,  1 6  C .  
·wRIGHT, A .  MILLER, E .  CooPER & E .  GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ §  40 1 9-27 ( 1 977 )  w1th 1 9  WRIGHT, MILLER & CooPER, supra note 1 4 ,  § §  4 5 1 4 - 1 5 . See 
also mjra note 7 1 .  
·rhe Court has made progress in  collapsing analy tical barriers by c i t ing a case dis ­
p lacing state law in s tate court as sufficiently analogous to lend s upport to a discussion 
of the borrowing of s tate law in federal court .  Burks v .  Lasker, 44 1 U . S .  a t  479 (c i t ing 
Brown v .  Western Ry . ,  338 U . S .  294,  298 ( 1 949) ) .  For a recent case displacing state law 
as to the admiss ion of evidence and jury instructions with uniform federal law, see Nor­
folk & W. Ry.  v .  Liepelt,  444 U . S .  490 ( 1 980) . 
7 1 Commentators have recognized the poss ibi l i ty that "principles akin to federal 
preemption may occasionally require s tate courts to follow federal rules of preclus ion."  
18 WRIGHT, MILLER & CoOPER, supra note 1 4 ,  § 4467 ,  at  625 .  Apart fro m  a reorienta­
t ion in thinking about the full  fai th and credit s tatute, the approach taken in this  Article 
suggests that the problem i s  amenable to federal common law analysis and that displace­
ment may be appropriate more often than previously recognized.  
Even before the demise of the tenth amendment as an independent check on fed­
eral  lawmaking competence, see Garcia v .  San Antonio Met .  Tra n s i t  Auth . , 1 05 S.  Ct .  
1 005 ( 1 985) , rev 'g 557 F.  Supp .  445 (W.D .  Tex .  1 983 ) ,  preclus ion law, because of i ts  
substantive impact ,  was an unl ikely  candidate for solicitude under that  rubric .  CJ. Fed­
eral Energy Regula tory Comm'n v. Miss is s ipp i, 456 U . S .  742 ( 1 982 )  (holding that provi­
s ions of Public U ti l i ty Regulatory Policies Act of 1 978 requir ing s tates to consider 
s tandards and to follow certain procedures in doing so are not u n const i tut ional inva­
sions of state sovereignty ) .  But cf id. at 7 7 1 -75 (Powell ,  j ., concurring and dissent ing) 
( s tating that procedural provisions of the Act violate the tenth amendment) . 
7'2 Where state court adj udication may preclude federal substant ive righ ts , and 
where there i s ,  accordingly,  federal lawmaking power as to precl u s i o n  rules, would we 
s av  that ,  when s tate preclus ion rules are employed , they are really federal common law 
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If the full  fai th and credit s tatute does not choose s tate law as 
the measure of the interj urisdictional effects of s tate judgments-it 
certainly does not speak to the law that governs their effects domes­
tically-the approach taken in recent decisions of the Supreme 
Court from Allen v. i\1cCurry73 to j'vfigra v. Warren City School District 
Board of Education, 74 if  not their results , is almost surely wrong.  The 
Court ' s  approach , requiring that "Congress must ' clearly manifest '  
i ts  intent to depart from [section] 1 738 ,"75 would make sense if 
Congress had made a choice of s tate preclusion law in the ful l  faith 
and credit statute . 76 It makes no sense if, as I maintain ,  Congress 
made no such choice. 77 Again , s tate preclusion law rather than uni­
form federal law will govern in  most  cases , but the safety net that 
Justice Marshall was looking for in Haring v. Prosise, 78 in the process 
complicating the law of interj urisdictional preclusion (if that is  pos­
sible) ,79 is  at hand . State preclusion rules that are hosti le to or in-
or s tate l a w  borrowed a s  federal l a w ?  I doubt i t ,  b u t  t h a t  is t h e  parlance of  traditional 
federal common law analysis .  
We should, however, be quite comfortable with the notion that,  under the Rules of 
Decision Act ,  which is binding on the S upreme Court,  s tate preclusion law must yield 
when federal substantive policies so require. Perhaps this difficulty, psychological i f  noth­
ing else, has contributed to the fai lure to see the problems in their entirety. See supra 
note 70 .  Of course, once one s tarts down that road ,  one may begin to question the 
traditional two-s tep federal common law analysis even in  i ts  conventional applications .  
See supra text  accompanying notes 29-30 & 36 .  
73 449 U . S .  90 ( 1 980) . 
7 4  1 04 S .  C t .  892 ( 1 984) .  " I t  i s  now set tled that a federal court must  give t o  a s ta te­
court j udgment the same preclusive effect as would be  given that judgment under the 
law of the S tate in  which the judgment was rendered . "  !d. at  896.  
75 Kremer v .  Chemical Constr .  Corp . ,  456 U . S .  46 1 ,  4 7 7  ( 1 98 2 ) .  
I t  has long been established that § 1 73 8  does n o t  al low federal courts to 
employ their own rules of  res j udicata in  determining the effect of state 
j udgments .  Rather, i t  goes beyond the common law and commands a 
federal court to accept the rules chosen by the State from which the judg­
ment is taken. McELmoyle v .  Cohen, 1 3  Pet .  3 1 2 ,  326 ( 1 839 ) ;  lvfills v .  Duryee, 
7 Cranch 48 1 ,  485 ( 1 8 1 3 ) .  
!d. a t  48 1 -8 2 .  The cases cited b y  the Court nei ther require the interpretation given them 
by the Court nor foreclose the in terpretation suggested here. 
76 If Congress had made a choice of  s tate preclusion law in  the ful l  faith and credit 
s ta tute, federal preclusion law might properly be regarded as an exception to the s tatu­
tory direction, applicable only as a consequence of  a subsequent s tatute containing an 
express or implied partial  repeal of § 1 73 8 .  
7 7  T h e  o n l y  relevant  choice made by Congress in  t h e  full  faith a n d  credit statute i s  
t h e  choice of subsequent proceedings in  t h e  courts of t h e  s tate from which t h e  judgment 
issued as a model or referent .  In  most cases ,  s tate preclusion law will  furnish the rules in 
this context. I n  some cases,  however, federal law will  supervene according to the nor­
mal principles governing the relationship between federal and state law. When that oc­
curs, there has been no exception to the full  faith and credit s ta tute,  and thus there is no 
need to meet the demanding s tandards of  an express or implied partial repeal. 
78 1 03 S .  C t .  2368 ( 1 98 3 ) .  
79  See 1d. at 2 3 7 3  & n . 7 .  The Court's reliance on Montana v .  United S ta tes, 4 4 0  U .S .  
1 4 7  ( 1 979) ,  i s  curious .  I n  that case, uniform federal preclusion rules were applied to 
determine the effects of a state court adj udication of federal constitutional claims on the 
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consistent with federal substantive policies must yield to federal 
common law domes tically, and the s tatute makes the domestic solu­
tion binding national ly . 80 
This approach is not a panacea. I t  does not provide an obvious 
answer to a case where a federal s tatute may be thought to express a 
policy in favor of a federal forum, but  one not strong enough to 
result in a grant of exclusive j urisdiction .  In that situation, one mus t 
confront  the choice that section 1 738 unquestionably makes ,  
namely, reference to  the law that would be applied in  a subsequent 
action in s tate court, where a policy in favor of a federal forum is not  
pertinent. 8 1  Nor does i t  provide such an answer for the exclusive 
jurisdiction cases themselves . Whatever one thinks of Judge Pos­
ner's opinion in N!arrese v .  American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 82 
which precluded a federal antitrust  claim functionally s imilar to a 
s tate antitrust  claim that could have been joined with o ther claims in  
antecedent s tate litigation,  perhaps he  was correct  in concluding 
that the full  faith and credit s tatute does not play a role . 83 The 
United States.  The Montana Court made no mention of  28 U . S . C .  § 1 73 8  ( 1 98 2 ) ,  the ful l  
fai th and credit  s tatute .  justice Marshall ,  who wrote the Haring opinion ,  was also the 
author of the Court 's  opinion in  Montana . 
According to the approach suggested here, i t  may be that uniform federal preclu­
sion rules should govern in a case s imilar to ,'V/ontana but where the second action i s  
brought in  s tate  court, the  model  provided by  § 1 73 8 ,  and thus  in a subsequent action in  
federal court .  CJ. Uni ted States v .  M endoza, 1 04 S .  C t .  568 ( 1 984)  (nonmutual i s sue  
preclusion does not  apply  as agains t the United States) . But ,  i f  that  were  true, i t  would 
result  from the pecul iar status o f  the United States as a l i t igant.  
80 Apart from s i tuations where federal substantive pol icy requires,  but state law 
does not cal l  for, preclusion, see 1 8  WRIGHT, M ILLER & CoOPER,  supra note  1 4 , § 4467, at  
625-26;  supra note 7 1 , concern is most l ikely to ar ise in connection with state rules  that  
are broadly preclusive but relatively inflexible .  Indeed,  this  may have been the Court 's  
concern in Haring. See Haring, 1 03 S .  Ct .  a t  2373 n.7 .  Trans-subs tantive preclusion rules  
can only  imperfectly accommodate the array of  substantive pol ic ies wi th  which  they  in­
teract,  and preclusion rules have a dramatic effect on assertions of substantive righ t .  In  
such circumstances, broad j udge-made rules of preclusion are  tolerable o n ly if  they are 
sufficiently flexible to adjust  to particular circumstances that would make preclusion in­
appropriate .  Trans-systemic, trans-subs tantive preclusion rules are even more 
wornsome. 
8 I The Court was presented with this problem in Migra v .  Warren C i ty School Dis t .  
Bd.  of Educ.,  1 04 S .  C t .  892 ( 1 984) and Allen v.  McCurry, 449 U.S .  90  ( 1 980) . The al i ­
or-nothing posture in which the quest ion of  preclusion was framed doubtless contrib­
uted to the Court 's  approach to § 1 73 8 .  
8 2  7 2 6  F . 2 d  ! I SO (7th Cir . )  ( e n  bane 1 984) ,  rev 'd, 5 3  U . S . L . W .  4 2 6 5  ( U . S .  Mar.  4 ,  
1 985) .  But see Car Carriers , Inc .  v .  Ford Motor Co . ,  583 F .  Sup p .  2 2 1 ,  2 2 6  n . S  (N .D .  I l l .  
1 984) (questioning ;\1anese) . 
8 3  But  whether or not section 1 73 8  al lows a federal court to  g ive  a state 
court's j udgment a greater preclusive effect than the state courts them­
selves would give i t  . . .  the  s tatute cannot be used to decide this case. 
The I l l inois courts, although hospitable to claims of res j udicata . . have 
not spol:zen to the . . issue and will never have occasion to  do so, since 
no federal antitrus t suit  can be brought in a s tate court .  The issue 
whether such a suit  would be barred by res judicata therefore cannot 
arise. Section 1 7  38 cannot be used to decide this case. 
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problem is  not, however, that there can be no s tate law on the ques­
tion.  Rather, it i s  that, because of the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
federal courts ,  there can be no subsequent s tate proceeding m 
which the same issue of preclusive effects could arise . 84 
S implicity and predictability are important goals in the law of 
interjurisdictional preclusion.  In seeking them, however, we should 
not ignore either the complexity of our federal sys tem or the reality 
that preclusion rules have effects as well as purposes . Ironically, 
symmetry of a sort is attainable,  insofar as in  both the s tate-federal 
and federal-state configurations,  we are left with mixed regimes of  
federal and s tate law. 
,\1anese. 7 26 F.2d a t  1 1 54 .  
8 4  On this view, the Kremer Court should have decided whether t i t le  VII  vests  exclu­
sive j urisdict ion in  the federal courts before addressing the preclusion problem. See 
Kremer v. Chemical Constr .  Corp . ,  456 U . S .  4 6 1 ,  479 n . 20 ( 1 982) . 
